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THE ROLE OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL BODIES IN
VINDICATING REPUTATIONAL HARM
Shannon M. Heim'
"The world needs a better understanding of how the media works, some-
thing it never gets from teams of lawyers squabbling behind closed
doors. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
The freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment,2 and its
ability to inform and influence public opinion must be balanced against the
harm that can be done if that power is wielded carelessly. Individual citi-
zens, public officials, and corporations may seek redress for wrongs done
to their reputation through the law of defamation.' A delicate balance exists
between the right of an individual to protect his reputation and the right of
the press to publish.4
t Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney LLP and Adjunct Professor of Law at William Mitchell
College of Law. Ms. Heim specializes in telecommunication and First Amendment issues.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of Ms. Heim and do not represent the opin-
ion of Dorsey & Whitney or any client of the firm.
1 Brian Lambert, Battered by Recent Rulings, WCCO 'Re-Evaluating' Minnesota News
Council Role, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 16, 1997, at 8B. Brian Lambert is the staff
broadcast critic for the newspaper.
2 "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputa-
tion and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REv. 691 (1986).
4 The rising role of constitutional privilege as a central element in libel litigation sug-
gests that the balance strongly trends toward the press' right to publish. See Randall P.
Bezanson, Libel Law and the Press: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOwA L. REv. 226, 230
(1985).
As a practical matter, the truth or falsity of the challenged statement is no longer perti-
nent to the libel action. Liability, when found, is as often rested on a finding of abuse
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Defamation law is complicated and at times incomprehensible for the un-
initiated, leading to an enormous amount of criticism by both legislators
and scholars.' Most critics describe libel law as chaotic, confusing, and
unclear.' The chaotic nature of defamation law is primarily due to the fact
that, at present, defamation involves a juxtaposition of two bodies of law:
(1) the archaic state common law of libel and slander, and (2) First
Amendment jurisprudence. The former is a system arising from medieval
roots, while the latter was developed by the courts following the United
States Supreme Court's landmark New York Times v. Sullivan decision in
1964.' Change has not come easily to this area of the law. The system is
well entrenched through familiarity and a strong defense bar. As Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. suggests, "Change is threatening. Innovation may seem an
assault on the foundations of the universe."'
While recently pondering whether the law of defamation merited re-
statement, David A. Anderson, perhaps the nation's most renowned defa-
mation law scholar, suggested that "the effort required to make sense of its
doctrinal intricacy might be disproportionate to the benefits." 9 Although he
concluded that restating the law of defamation would yield little practical
benefit, he noted that "[r]ethinking the entire subject of reputation and free
speech, on the other hand, would be immensely useful."'
of privilege-another way of stating the fault-based constitutional privileges-as on a
finding of falsity of the publication and of reputational injury.
Id.
5 N.Y Times v. Sullivan developed First Amendment jurisprudence for defamation law
and is considered the seminal case by experts. See infra note 9. Harsh critics of Sullivan
abound. See, e.g. David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047
(2006) [hereinafter Rethinking Defamation]; David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Re-
forming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991) [hereinafter Libel Law]. Cook and LeBel offer a
more balanced viewpoint and approach; others criticize Sullivan within a larger division,
critiquing how defamation law has evolved. See Geoffrey C. Cook, Reconciling the First
Amendment with the Individual's Reputation: The Declaratory Judgment as an Option for
Libel Suits, 93 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1989); Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The
Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1657 (1987); Paul A. LeBel, Reforming the Tort of
Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing Interests Within the Current Constitu-
tional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249 (1987); M. Linda Dragas, Curing A Bad Reputa-
tion: Reforming Defamation Law, 17 U. HAw. L. REV. 113 (1995).
6 See, e.g. Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law through
Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 293 (1994).
Interestingly, many criticisms of defamation law have shifted to its applicability to speech
on the Internet, perhaps an acknowledgment that reform of the traditional jurisprudence
remains unlikely. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment,
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11
(2006); Melissa Troiano, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should
Apfly to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447 (2006).
Ackerman, supra note 6, at 293; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 424 (1986).
9 Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5, at 1047.
10 Id.
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This article accepts Anderson's challenge and proposes the use of state
news councils as an alternative to traditional libel litigation for a more ef-
fective vindication of reputational injury. Part II examines the meaning of
reputation, its role in social discourse, and why potential litigants require
an alternative mechanism for addressing that injury. Part III discusses the
legal framework of current libel law to better understand the need for an
alternative method of recourse for those harmed by the media. Part IV ex-
plores the practical challenges for contemporary libel litigants. Part V con-
siders whether the deficiencies in the law and the needs of litigants can be
adequately addressed by various proposed reform agendas. Part VI exam-
ines the success of the Minnesota News Council and proposes a renewed
consideration of state news councils to address and remedy reputational
injury.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY OF REPUTATION AND
LIBEL LAW REFORM
A. The Role of Reputation in Civil Discourse
Libel claims predicate themselves on reputational injury. Thus a founda-
tional understanding of the meaning of reputation becomes the basis for
finding an appropriate remedy for such an injury." Although reputation is
generally a valuable asset that individuals and groups cultivate in personal
or professional relationships, it is difficult to quantify for legal purposes. 2
For this reason, the nature of reputation has been a point of contention
among scholars and the judiciary. 3 On one hand, reputation can be viewed
as the thread connecting our social relationships; on the other hand, it can
be viewed as an antiquated and outdated idea that is no longer relevant in
11 Several excellent articles provide a detailed discussion of the role of reputation in
defamation law and how, in turn, the failure of defamation law has impacted the appropriate
remedies available to protect one's reputation. See Post, supra note 3; Rethinking Defama-
tion, supra note 5; Robert Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL.
L. REv. 743 (1986).
12 See Post, supra note 3. "Reputation, however, is a mysterious thing." Id. at 692. See
also Travis M. Wheeler, Negligent Injury to Reputation: Defamation Priority and the Eco-
nomic Loss Rule, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 1103 (2006) (discussing different avenues for recovery
of reputational injury and concluding that certain circumstances justify consideration of
reputational injury under a theory of negligence).
3 Justice White suggested that "since libel plaintiffs are very likely more interested in
clearing their names than in damages, I doubt that limiting their recoveries would deter or
be unfair to them." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771
(1985). See also Post, supra note 3; Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5; Bellah, supra
note 11.
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an increasingly mobile world.' 4 "The right of a man to the protection of his
own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered lib-
erty.'
15
The essential question is what is reputation and what role does it play in
modem society? Professor Robert Bellah argues that "[r]eputation is the
extension and elaboration of that recognition which lies at the basis of our
social existence. 16 To Bellah, reputation is a relation among people. 7
When a person is defamed and claims a loss of reputation, she argues that
she has suffered a harm to and loss of relationships. 8 To recover damages,
in Bellah's view, the plaintiff would have to prove those relationships were
actually harmed, independent of the plaintiffs perception that social rela-
tionships were damaged.' 9 Another view, notes Bellah, is that reputation
serves as the backbone of a democratic society. 20 "The dignity that defama-
tion law protects is thus the respect (and self-respect) that arises from full
membership in society. ,21
In contrast, David Anderson views reputation as a product of a different
era. "Today most of us move from one community to another, not only
geographically, but also socially and professionally. Whatever reputation
we have in each of those communities may be recently acquired and shal-
lowly based.
22
14 See Post, supra note 3. Post describes three concepts of reputation: property, honor,
and dignity. Id. at 720. The concepts "stand in ambiguous relationship to each other." Id. at
720-21.
15 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's
description "can fairly be characterized as an authentic contemporary expression of com-
mon law understanding of the law of defamation." Post, supra note 3, at 707-08.
16 See Bellah, supra note 11.
'7 Id. at 743-44. "Thus, although we think of a person as 'having' a reputation, reputa-
tion is not a property or possession of individuals-it is a relation between persons." Id. at
743.
18 See id. at 743-51.
'9 Id. at 744.
20 Id. at 751 ("Considerations about reputation have led me to character and the linkage
of character, citizenship, and free institutions. I cannot think of any subject more worthy of
discussion in a democratic republic."). Bellah also views character as an essential element
of reputation. "In defending our reputation we are defending ourselves against defamation
of our character. Perhaps we could even speak of a 'character interest,' that, like the reputa-
tion interest, would be social as well as personal." Id. at 750. Cf. Nat Stem, Creating a New
Tort for Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 81 (2004) (focusing
on false light litigation to propose a new tort, wrongful misrepresentation of character, as an
alternative when juries are "legitimately torn between compelling arguments for both plain-
tiff and defendant.").
21 Post, supra note 3, at 711.
22 David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
747, 777 (1984).
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The treatment of defamation in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
23
bridges the gap between theory and law. The Restatement considers a
communication to be defamatory "if it tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him., 24 These comments suggest
that reputation is a social construction among members of a community.25
A communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes of
everyone in the community or of all his associates, nor even in the eyes of a majority
of them. It is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice him in the eyes
of a substantial and respectable minority of them.... 
26
B. Why Reputational Injury Provokes Plaintiffs to Seek Legal Redress
The Iowa Libel Project, the most comprehensive study of libel plaintiffs
completed to date, was a cross-disciplinary attempt to explain why people
sued for libel and what reform could be made to remedy the harm those
plaintiffs perceived. 27 The study concentrated more on the "why" of the
process rather than specific reform proposals, but the conclusions provide
an interesting perspective from which to contemplate reform.
The Iowa Libel Project studied libel plaintiffs who sued and appealed
their cases.2 ' Data was obtained from the following sources: a survey of
164 plaintiffs who sued the media for libel; an analysis of virtually all re-
ported defamation and privacy cases decided between 1974 and 1984; a
survey of sixty-one media defendants who were sued by the libel plaintiffs
who were interviewed; and in-depth interviews at six Midwestern newspa-
pers.29 The study's objective was to uncover why people sue for libel, es-
pecially when plaintiffs know that the success rate is low.3°
The media played a significant role in each plaintiffs decision to sue,
according to the plaintiffs interviewed in the study.31 Since a significant
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
24 id.
21 See id.
26 Id. at cmt. e.
27 See Bezanson, supra note 4, at 217. The project was conducted by Randall P. Bezan-
son, Professor of Law at the University of Iowa; Gilbert Cranberg, Gallup Professor of
Journalism at the University of Iowa; and John Soloski, Professor of Journalism at the Uni-
versity of Iowa. Id. at 215.
28 RANDALL BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 8
(1987). The study examined the financial arrangement between lawyer and client, the length
of time the plaintiff lived in the community when they were defamed, the defenses used by
the media, and the rate of success experienced by the plaintiffs. The study included 164
libel plaintiffs, all of whom were interviewed. Id.
29 Id. at 6.
30 Id. at 4. The Iowa Libel Project found that plaintiffs between 1974 and 1984 pre-
vailed only 12.6% of the time in defamation cases. Id. at 116.
31 Id. at 29.
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number of plaintiffs contact the offending media outlet before contacting
an attorney, "[t]he press [is given] an opportunity to resolve the dispute
before a lawyer enters the picture and before the complainant may even
have given serious thought to litigation.' 32 The Iowa Libel Project found
that the media wasted this golden opportunity to avert litigation and instead
treated the complaining citizen so poorly that the contact prompted litiga-
tion.33 Moreover, the study found that most newspapers were unprepared to
deal with the complaints and a general attitude of superiority and defen-
siveness prevailed in the newsroom.34 The poor treatment of complaints by
the media may be the most significant explanation for the amount of
"petty" claims that ripen into lawsuits.
The study found four main reasons plaintiffs sue the media: to restore
their reputation, deter further publication, win money damages, and punish
the media.35
Plaintiffs sue because they feel that they must do something, because they have no
other alternative available to them, because suing is perceived as a form of self-help in
counteracting the defamation, and because they are outraged at the indifference to their
feelings expressed in the response of the publisher to their contact.
36
While the data supported all four motivations to sue, the study concluded
that most plaintiffs were motivated by a need to restore their reputation.37
The study also found that the act of filing a suit seemed to bring a feeling
of victory to the plaintiff.38 Other scholars agree that sometimes plaintiffs
"win" simply by suing.39 "Having garnered publicity through the very act
of suing, plaintiffs, regardless of outcome, are able to call the defamatory
statement into question, and thus win by suing."'4
The Iowa Libel Project concluded that the "focus of libel suits [should]
be falsity, not fault, and that the objective should be correcting falsity with
truth, not money."4' Accordingly, the Iowa Libel Project suggests that re-
form refocus attention on the issue of falsity 42 and a return to reputation as
the central issue in the tort.43 It encourages litigation that focuses on the
subjective state of mind, plaintiff identity, and publisher procedure, rather
than attempting to remedy the real dispute.44
32 Id.
33 Id.
14 Id. at 30.
31 Id. at 79.
36 Id. at 213.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 80.
39 See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 293.
40 Bezanson, supra note 4, at 79.41 Id. at 170-71.
42 id.
43 Id. at 171.
44 Id. at 195.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBEL LAW
A. Common Law Development of Libel
Although libel law is no longer a purely common law phenomenon, a
brief examination of the common law of libel remains relevant, because it
still dictates the prima facie case that a plaintiff must establish to prevail
on a libel claim.4" The constitutionalization of libel law added considerable
complexity and shifted the competing interests at issue in litigation.46 Any
attempt to reform libel law begins at this fundamental common law level,
since only the Supreme Court can rewrite the constitutional requirements it
has established.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies four required elements to
sustain an action for defamation: a false and defamatory statement con-
cerning another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amount-
ing at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and either actionabil-
ity of the statement irrespective of special harm done or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.47
While these elements may seem simple on the surface, First Amendment
jurisprudence complicates each one. One court suggested a figurative
Venn Diagram for understanding the overlapping bodies of law:
The first circle represents state defamation law and embodies the significant interest
states have in providing tort remedies for injuries to reputation. The second circle, im-
pinging on the first to varying degrees depending on language and interpretation,
represents state constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of the
press. The third circle overlaps both the first and the second and embodies federal free
expression and free press guarantees.
49
Predictably, such complications inherent in inextricable bodies of law cre-
ate problems for litigants.
45 However, the elements of a prima facie case differ depending on the identity of the
plaintiff, the identity of the defendant, the character of the defamatory statement and the
jurisdiction whose law applies. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §558 (establishing
prima facie case); § 580A (establishing prima facie case for public official plaintiff when
controversy concerns public matter); § 580B (establishing prima facie case for public offi-
cial plaintiff when controversy concerns private matter).
46 Criticism of the constitutionalization of libel law remains a consistent theme over
decades. Cf. Bezanson, supra note 4 and Anderson, supra note 5, at 1053.
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 558 (1977).
48 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323-24 (1974) (discussing ele-
ments required for NY. Times protection against liability).
49 West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994).
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B. Emergence of Libel Law in Constitutional Jurisprudence
In 1964, the Supreme Court constitutionalized libel law in New York
Times v. Sullivan.5 ° Prior to Sullivan, libel fell solely under state jurisdic-
tion.' At issue in the case was an advertisement in the New York Times
that allegedly libeled L.B. Sullivan, then the Commissioner of Public Af-
fairs for Montgomery, Alabama.52 The full-page advertisement included a
number of inaccuracies, two of which referenced behavior of the Mont-
gomery Police Department that Sullivan supervised. 3 Neither the Commis-
sion nor the Commissioner were specifically named in the advertisement.
The Court held that the evidence was "constitutionally insufficient" to sat-
isfy the actual malice requirement and to support a holding that the state-
ments referred to Sullivan.54
The central issues in the opinion were what standard of fault should be
applied when the plaintiff is a public official, and whether a public official
should ever be able to win a libel case.55 The Court expressed concern that
if the standard of fault was too low for public officials, debate on govern-
mental conduct would be stifled.56 The Court held that the guarantees of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments require
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.
57
Thus, the Court created a new standard called "actual malice," which is
distinctly different from the common law definition of "malice," meaning
"ill will."58 Actual malice was defined by the Court as "knowing falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth."5 9 This standard is difficult for any plaintiff
to prove because it involves the subjective element of intent of the author
or editor.60 To prevail, there must be some evidence that the author knew or
should have known that the defamatory statement was false and thus dem-
50 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
51 See Kristian D. Whitten, The Economics of Actual Malice: A Proposal For Legisla-
tive Change To The Rule of New York Times. v. Sullivan, 32 CuMB. L. REv. 519, 522
(2002).
52 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
" Id. at 258-59.
54 Id. at 292.
" Id. at 256.
56 Id. at 291.
" Id. at 279-80.
58 See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting State Power
to Articulate and Develop Tort Law-Defamation, Preemption, and Punitive Damages, 74
U. CrN. L. REv. 1189, 1204 (2006).
'9 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
60 Id. at 262-63.
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onstrated a reckless disregard for the truth.6 In the years since Sullivan, the
Court has identified three elements that may show reckless disregard for
the truth: reliance on a source whose creditability is in doubt, reliance on a
source whose version is unconfirmed, or the explicit ignoring of sources
that may confirm the falsity of the defamatory statement.62
C. Supreme Court's Subsequent Decisions Darken an Already Muddy Pot
Since 1964, the application of the actual malice standard has been ex-
panded to include other classes of plaintiffs in addition to public officials.63
Public figures, as well as some private parties, have been required to prove
actual malice to recover damages.' 4 The Court in Rosenbloom v. Metrome-
dia, Inc. required private parties to prove actual malice if the defamatory
comments pertained to an issue of public interest.65 However, the plurality
decision led to a degree of uncertainty regarding the burden of proof
The Supreme Court retreated from the position articulated in Rosen-
bloom in Gertz v. Welch, Inc.66 The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney who
represented a family suing the Chicago Police Department for the wrongful
police shooting death of their son. 67 A magazine wrote a story about Gertz,
asserting that he had a long police record, was an official of the Marxist
League, and was a practicing communist.68 Gertz sued the magazine for
defaming him as a private citizen and attorney. 69 The trial court first de-
clared Gertz a private person, then reversed itself and decided that, because
an issue of public interest was involved, Gertz should be required to prove
actual malice.7" Gertz appealed and the Court of Appeals upheld the deci-
61 Id. at 279-80.
62 See Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence Of Judicial Stan-
dards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 30-51 (1994).
63 See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (expanding the actual malice
standard to public figures). The Court has delineated two classes of public figures. An indi-
vidual may achieve such fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes
and in all contexts. More likely, an individual voluntarily inserts himself or is drawn into a
specific public controversy, and thus becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.
In either case, such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions
and are subject to the actual malice standard if they are defamed in the course of that public
discussion. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974); see also David
Finkelson, The Status/Conduct Continuum: Injecting Rhyme and Reason Into Contempo-
rary Public Official Defamation Doctrine, 84 VA. L. REV. 871, 907 (1998).
See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (holding that the New York
Times' actual malice standard applies to a civil libel action brought by a private individual).
65 Id. at 43-44.
66 Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
67 Id. at 325.
68 Id. at 326.
69 Id. at 327.
70 Id. at 328-29 (holding that Gertz was "neither a public official nor a public figure"
for the purpose of the defamatory statements).
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sion on the basis of Rosenbloom.7 The Supreme Court overturned the de-
cision, finding that Gertz was a private person who did not need to prove
actual malice to recover for defamation.72 The Court also held that the State
may not impose liability without some showing of fault.73 While a state
may require negligence as the lowest level of fault, individual states are
free to impose a higher standard.74 Many states even require a private citi-
zen to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages, which
has contributed to confusion in the system and a lack of success for the
plaintiff."
IV. THE CHALLENGES FOR CONTEMPORARY LIBEL LITIGANTS
Current libel law satisfies no one's needs.76 There is a general consensus
among both plaintiffs and defendants that the system is not an effective
way to resolve disputes. 77 "Plaintiffs, defendants, judges, lawyers and aca-
demicians have all criticized modern libel law; in practice it neither ade-
quately protects First Amendment values nor provides plaintiffs with an
efficient, meaningful forum for vindicating reputational damage., 78 As
Professor Prosser famously declared, "[i]t must be confessed at the begin-
ning that there is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no
sense."
79
A. The Plaintiff Just Cannot Win
Once a plaintiff has met the burden of whatever standard of fault the par-
ticular court requires him to prove, the plaintiff must additionally demon-
71 Id. at 330.
72 Id. at 351-52.
" Id. at 347.
14 Id. at 348.
71 Id. at 349.
76 See Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5, at 1049-50. See also David A. Logan,
Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REv.
503, 508 (2001). Logan concludes:
[T]he New York Times/Gertz regime has eviscerated the law of libel to the point that it
now poses little serious threat to the First Amendment rights of the media, and that the
image of the contemporary media, cowed by the threat of libel claims, is unsupported
by the available evidence.
Id.
77 See Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Pro-
posal: The Case For Enactment, 31 WM & MARY L. REV. 25, 30-31 (1989).
78 Id. at 31.
79 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 771
(5th ed. 1984).
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strate harm to his reputation in order to collect damages.80 Reputation is not
an easily quantifiable commodity, and thus damages are a tricky thing for a
plaintiff to prove.8"
The actual malice standard imposes considerable burdens of proof upon
a plaintiff before he can recover any damages. The Gertz Court held that
"the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at
least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth." 2 Although jury awards can be substan-
tial,83 a plaintiff's opportunity to get a case before a jury is minimal.
The requirement of clear and convincing proof usually applies even at the summary
judgment stage, so plaintiffs can't get before a jury unless they can convince the judge
on the basis of discovery evidence that they will be able to prove clearly and convinc-
ingly that the defendant knew the defamatory statement was probably false.
84
Some scholars argue that plaintiffs do not actually look for large damage
awards, but rather file suit to vindicate their reputation.85 "The publisher's
conduct, in the view of plaintiffs, is wrong principally because what was
published was false; fault and responsibility are not at issue, but correction
is."8 6 Adjudication of the actual issues of truth and falsity rarely occurs.
Rather, most lawsuits focus on "fault, privileges and subjective state of
mind."87 However, plaintiffs generally do not emerge from the legal mo-
rass of libel law satisfied with the outcome of the litigation or the process
itself.
B. The Defendant Wins but at a High Cost of Time and Resources
Although libel defendants most often prevail in defamation lawsuits,
there is a significant downside.88 The cost in money and other intangible
80 See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1971); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 770 (1985).
81 See Anderson, supra note 22.
82 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. The courts have assumed that the constitutional ban on pre-
sumed damages does not apply when actual malice is shown. See, e.g., Babb v. Minder, 806
F.2d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 1986); Mittleman v. Witous, 552 N.E.2d 973, 980 (Ill. 1989).
83 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. In Burnett v. Nat'l Enquirer, 144 Cal.App.3d 991, 1018 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983), the jury awarded Carol Bumett $1.3 million in punitive damages. The
award was reduced to $150,000 by the Court of Appeals of Califomia.
84 Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5, at 1050.
85 BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 212. "The chief interest of plaintiffs lies in vindi-
cating reputation through proof of falsity; it does not lie in obtaining damages for loss suf-
fered, or in playing a part in modifying the general functions or processes of the press." Id.
86 Id. at 212.
87 Id. at 213; see also Logan, supra note 76, at 503. Logan examines statistics compiled
by the Libel Defense Resource Center to assess the future direction of libel litigation. Id. at
509.
88 Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law
for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 419 (1991). "The
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resources can be draining for a libel defendant.89 "Vindicated or not, libel
defendants often incur substantial costs. Even when no awards are actually
paid, material costs most obviously include the legal fees paid, the value of
the time committed, and skyrocketing insurance premiums." 90 Although
media defendants face high costs in a defamation suit, the rule of law gen-
erally favors them.9'
One of the reasons that media defendants often prevail in libel suits are
the myriad defenses available to them. Retraction laws in most states pro-
vide a statutory defense by requiring a plaintiff to request a retraction from
the media before filing a libel suit.92 If the plaintiff does not request a re-
traction, he may be limited to special damages (if he wins his suit) or de-
nied the right to maintain a suit at all.93 If the defendant does publish a re-
traction or correction, it can be used as a partial or complete defense at
trial, depending on the state law. 94
Although defendants most often prevail in libel suits, the cost of litiga-
tion makes even the most self-righteous defendant feel victimized. Reform
has been slow, in part due to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the me-
dia.95 Although the current system is not ideal for libel defendants, it is a
known quantity whereas most of the reform proposals threaten to subject
the media to less certain victory.
vast majority of recent libel suits have ultimately failed in the courts. Most of those are
dismissed by summary judgment before they go to trial." Id. at 419-20.
89 Id. at 420.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 419-20.
92 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-03 (1996) (implementing the Uniform Correction
or Clarification of Defamation Act). "A person may maintain an action for defamation only
if the person has made a timely and adequate request for correction or clarification from the
defendant or the defendant has made a correction or clarification." Id.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., N.D. CENT CODE § 32-43-05 (1996). "If a timely and sufficient correction
or clarification is made, a person may recover only provable economic loss, as mitigated by
the correction or clarification." Id.
95 Due to the growing issues in libel law, the Minnesota News Council attempted to
create an alternative to libel litigation by creating a forum for individuals and corporations
to present complaints of unfair news reporting. Other states such as Florida and Oregon
have followed suit providing their own non-judicial forums to hear libel suits. The progress
of such forums has been slowed through because "[miembers of press associations in other
states, including Kentucky, Wisconsin and Oregon, have voted to reject such [news] coun-
cils." Dennis Hale, ADR and The Minnesota News Council on Libel, 49 Disp. RESOL. J.
77-79 (1994).
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V. PROPOSED REFORM OF LIBEL LAW
Libel law clearly needs some type of significant reform if it is to serve
any purpose.96 The current system is broken, perhaps irrevocably.9 7 "The
actual malice rule... leaves vast numbers of people-perhaps most of the
victims of media defamation-with no legal remedy for damage to reputa-
tion.1
98
Determining exactly what kind of reform would best benefit all parties
proves a difficult challenge. 99 Yet libel law reform also offers the possibil-
ity of a tangible win-win situation. The plaintiff should be able to be made
whole at little cost to the defendant, a result which protects both reputa-
tional interests and free speech rights. This section examines the different
proposed reform approaches in an effort to evaluate the potential for suc-
cessful reform.'0o
Libel law was the province of the states prior to New York Times v. Sulli-
van in 1964. Thus state law enjoys a long history of dealing with the com-
plex problems presented by libel law'0 ' and state legislatures are a natural
place for reform to begin. At least one scholar has suggested that, "in light
of the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements in Sullivan, state
legislatures may properly enact state libel laws that take account of New
York Times' constitutional concern, but offer a different solution."'0 2 State
law reform has not yet become a reality, but not for want of trying.
96 While pondering whether or not the law of defamation merits restatement, noted
scholar David Anderson notes that "[a]s a source of litigation, there is little left of the law of
defamation." Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5, at 1049. David Logan concurs, charac-
terizing libel litigation as "very rare" compared to tort litigation generally. See Logan, supra
note 76, at 519.
97 "But as the likelihood of suing or being sued for libel and slander suits has faded, one
has to assume that the importance of the law as a guide to conduct has diminished, too."
Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5, at 1052. See also, Libel Law, supra note 5, at 489.
98 Libel Law, supra note 5, at 525.
99 See generally Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 77, at 25.
10o This section does not represent an exhaustive survey of all reform proposals, but
provides a representative sample of proposals debated among scholars. Many reform pro-
posals focus on very narrow aspects of the law that fall outside the purview of a news coun-
cil.
101 However, most of the problems can be traced to the Supreme Court's insertion of
constitutional concepts into libel law in Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Libel Law, supra
note 5, at 537-38.
102 Whitten, supra note 51, at 522. In support of his conclusion, Whitten cites Dickerson
v. United States. Id. at 523. In Dickerson, the Supreme Court held that although federal
legislation attempting to "abrogate" the Miranda rule was unconstitutional, the "Constitu-
tion would not preclude legislative solutions that differed form the prescribed Miranda




A. Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act
The Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act ("Uniform
Correction Act") was promulgated by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1993.°3 The uniform law was drafted
because the Conference did not find state retraction statutes an effective
remedy to the reputational harm suffered by plaintiffs." 4 Additionally, the
state retraction statutes did not provide adequate incentives to either party
to seriously consider retraction as a viable alternative to a lawsuit.'0 5 "The
Uniform Correction Act seeks to remedy these flaws in current law by pro-
viding strong incentives for individuals to promptly correct or clarify an
alleged defamation as an alternative to costly litigation."'10 6 The law at-
tempts to change how parties go about settling defamation cases and it
provides incentives for the early resolution of litigation on terms accept-
able to both plaintiffs and defendants.'07
The Uniform Correction Act requires a plaintiff to request a clarification
or correction within ninety days after knowledge of the defamatory publi-
cation. 1 8 The request for a retraction is not a per se requirement for main-
taining a libel suit under the Uniform Correction Act.'09 If a plaintiff fails
to meet this requirement within the ninety day window, he loses out on a
substantial portion of his potential damages, but he can still pursue the
case.
110
The Uniform Correction Act also allows a publisher to significantly limit
his liability for an alleged defamation by publishing a correction or clarifi-
cation."' The Conference was hopeful that publishers would take advan-
103 UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT (1994).
104 Id. at 1 (Prefatory Note). "These [retraction] statutes have been largely ineffective
because they most often apply to a narrow range of cases and they do not create sufficient
incentives on both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, to come to an agreement regard-
ing retraction." Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. The Uniform Correction Act is actually one section of a longer proposed act that
was withdrawn under a significant amount of pressure. The original act was a much longer
and more complex attempt at wholesale reform.
107 Ackerman, supra note 6, at 314. "Recognizing that a massive revision of the substan-
tive law of libel and slander was beyond reach, the Committee produced an act designed to
change the manner in which parties would go about trying and more significantly settling
defamation cases." Id.
108 UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION § 3. A person may maintain
an action for defamation only if: (1) the person has made a timely and adequate request for
correction or clarification from the defendant; or (2) the defendant has otherwise made a
correction or clarification." Id. § 3(a).
109 See id. The Uniform Correction Act uses the term "correction or clarification" rather
than the more traditional "retraction." The new terms are more descriptive and carry fewer
stigmas for the defendants than "retraction." Id. at 1.
Id. § 3(b).
... Id. § 5. "If a timely and sufficient correction or clarification is made, a person may
recover only provable economic loss, as mitigated by the correction or clarification." Id.
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tage of this provision given the large costs of litigation and potential for
large awards of general and punitive damages. "Much grief and embar-
rassment to the defamed party may be avoided at little expense or trouble
to the publisher through the simple measure of a correction or clarification,
which can prevent a molehill of misunderstanding from turning into a
mountain of litigation."
' 12
The last substantive provision of the Uniform Correction Act allows the
publisher to offer the correction or clarification in writing and pay the de-
famed person's reasonable litigation expenses incurred prior to the publica-
tion of the correction or clarification." 3 Written acceptance of an offer of
this type bars or terminates an action for defamation." 4 If the plaintiff re-
fuses to accept the offer, he may only recover provable economic loss and
reasonable expenses of litigation."5
As with any Uniform law, the Uniform Correction Act drafters sought
intact passage of the Act by all fifty states' legislatures." 6 In this case, the
likelihood of passage was dependent on the "depth of support for it from
some of the key groups most affected by it: the news media, plaintiffs
attorneys and insurers."' '7 As predicted by scholars, the law failed wide-
spread passage."' Only North Dakota has ratified the Uniform Correction
Act, which cannot be seen as wide acceptance of the legislation." 9 A com-
bination of a strong defense bar and the failure of states to see the Uniform
Correction Act as an adequate remedy for the ills that plague libel law
likely doomed wider acceptance of the legislation. 20
B. State Law Reform of Actual Malice Application
In a thorough critique of the New York Times "actual malice" standard,
California Deputy Attorney General Kristian Whitten argues that strict
application of the actual malice rule is no longer warranted. 12' He proposes
to reform libel law at the state level by making "any defamation plaintiffs
provable economic loss ... recoverable without a showing of 'actual mal-
112 Ackerman, supra note 6, at 318.
113 UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT § 8(a).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See Dragas, supra note 5, at 148.
117 Id.
118 id.
119 See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-43-01, et seq. (2005) North Dakota has adjudi-
cated a few cases under this Act that have been reported, See Fish v. Dockter, 671 N.W.2d
819 (N.D. 2003), and Forster v. West Dakota Veterinary Clinic, 689 N.W.2d 366 (N.D.
2004). Extensive discussion of those decisions is unfortunately outside the scope of this
paer as those cases do not impact upon the wholesale reform of libel law.
Dragas, supra note 5, at 163.
121 Whitten, supra note 51, at 522.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ice,"' and further proposes that recoverable "economic losses not exceed
the amount by which the media defendant actually profits from the de-
famatory falsehood."'22 Whitten concludes that such a state statute would
be "consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the New York Times
rule.
123
Whitten proposes to replace the strict actual malice requirement with a
more lenient standard of fault and a more restrictive approach to dam-
ages. 124 Justices Harlan and Marshall advocated this approach in their sepa-
rate dissents in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.1 25 The concept of limiting
economic recovery to the amount of benefit received by the publisher is
analogous to recovery mechanisms found in trademark law. 126 Whitten
suggests that this type of recovery device would have a deterrent effect and
"would help insure that members of the media are not unjustly enriched at
the expense of a defamation plaintiffs reputation. 127
Whitten's proposed statutory reform of libel law raises an interesting
question: how analogous are trademark and libel law? The closer the two
bodies of law, the more sense the reform proposal makes. However, the
nature of libel and the motivations provoking libel litigation differ, some-
times greatly, from trademark. 12' Trademark is an economic tort and liti-
gants generally seek financial compensation for use of the mark.129 On the
other hand, "[d]efamation is a dignitary tort; attempting to reduce it to a
remedy for economic loss would be historically unfaithful, doctrinally
122 Id. at 535-36.
123 Id. at 536. Although Whitten asserts that his proposed change of tort law would be
accepted by the Supreme Court as it serves the constitutional purposes of Sullivan, the issue
may not be so clear cut. David Anderson suggests that the complicated pronouncements of
how state law "should be modified to make it constitutional" create uncertainty. Rethinking
Defamation, supra note 5, at 1056. Whether the Court's "suggestions" represent prophylac-
tic rules, federal common law, or constitutional principles will not be addressed "until a
state adopts an alternative modification to the law of defamation and the Court has to decide
whether its own pronouncements are in fact the only permissible solution." Id. at 1056.
124 Whitton, supra note 51, at 523-24.
125 403 U.S. 29, 71-86 (1971) (Harlan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The Court later
adopted this view when it addressed the appropriate standard of fault a private person must
demonstrate to recover damages. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
126 Whitten, supra note 51, at 562-63 (discussing the "strong analogies between trade-
mark infringement and libel.").
127 Id. at 563.
128 The Supreme Court has expressed this view consistently. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985). "Given the defense of truth, [and] in order to
assure that it promotes purposes consistent with First Amendment values, the legitimate
function of libel law must be understood as that of compensating individuals for actual
measurable harm caused by the conduct of others." Whitten, supra note 51, at 560 (quoting
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 55 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2004).
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radical, and destructive of important cultural values.' 30 Removing actual
malice from the libel equation represents an intriguing proposal, but it re-
mains to be seen whether any state chooses to accept Whitten's challenge.
C. Annenberg Reform Proposal
The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, released in 1988, was one of the
most talked about proposals in the past thirty years. 131 It proposed a com-
prehensive model statute with accompanying commentary, 3 2 generating a
great deal of attention in academic and professional circles. 33 The Com-
mittee that produced the proposal represented a spectrum of constituencies,
which was designed to lend credence to the final product.'34
The proposal grew out of the premise that the current libel law was
"costly, cumbersome, and fail[ed] to vindicate either free speech values or
the protection of reputation."' 35 The Annenberg group found that there was
rarely "a clear-cut resolution of what ought to be the heart of the matter: a
determination of the truth of falsity of what was published."' 136 There are
three primary stages to the Annenberg proposal: a forceful retraction and
130 Rethinking Defamation, supra note 5, at 1047. Anderson's comment was directed at
the notion of restating defamation as an economic tort and does not reflect directly on
Whitten's proposed reform.
131 Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 77, at 26.
132 Ackerman, supra note 6, at 293-94.
133 Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 77, at 27. "Virtually every major newspaper in the
United States carried stories about the report; many publications ran editorials commenting
upon it; and a virtual cottage industry of symposia and conferences sprang up in its wake to
discuss it." Id. at 26-7.
134 Members included: Sandra S. Baron, then the director of NBC's legal department;
Bruce E. Fein, constitutional law scholar and former general counsel of the FCC; Judge
Lois G. Forer; Samuel E. Klein, noted media defense attorney; Anthony Lewis, Pulitzer
Prize winning New York Times columnist; Roslyn A. Mazer, First Amendment attorney;
Chad E. Milton, press attorney for Media/Professional Insurance, one of the largest libel
insurance underwriters; Anthony S. Murry, media attorney who represented General West-
moreland; Herbert Schmertz, former director and vice president for public relations of Mo-
bile Oil; Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., media attorney and former general counsel for the United
States Information Agency and Voice of America; and Rodney A. Smolla, director of the
Annenberg Libel Reform Project. Id. at 27-30.
135 Id. at 31. "Enormous defense costs of protracted litigation exert a chilling effect on
the press, while plaintiffs are left with no meaningful legal remedy for reputational injury."
Id. at 31.
136 Id. The philosophy of the Annenberg Libel Project is that "freedom of speech and the
law of defamation should function in harmony to serve the compelling public interest in the
discovery of the truth." Id. at 32.
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reply requirement,' a declaratory judgment provision,' and an action for
damages similar to a traditional defamation suit.'39
1. Retraction and Reply Requirement
Under this provision, every potential plaintiff must seek either a retrac-
tion or an opportunity to reply before filing suit. 40 The request must be
made within thirty days of publication of the defamatory statement. 14' Fail-
ure to comply bars the plaintiff from later bringing a defamation action
against the defendant. 42 If the request is granted within thirty days by the
would-be defendant, the plaintiff is also barred from bringing suit.
43
The retraction and reply requirements are intended to expedite the (cur-
rently) protracted process of defamation litigation. The drafters of the pro-
posal hope that the almost immediate retraction and reply will defuse libel
litigation at an early stage.' 44 Quick intervention through retraction and
reply is intended to remedy what the project members saw as deficiencies
in the current process. 145 State retraction statutes are seen as "toothless"
paper tigers that are ineffective in deterring litigation or producing mean-
ingful retractions.
46
The criticism of this section was vigorous. The primary complaints were
that an uneducated plaintiff may be unaware of the law and thus may inad-
vertently find his suit barred because he or she failed to demand a retrac-
tion or an opportunity to reply within the statutory thirty-day window.
47
Also, discovery of the defamatory statement may occur after the thirty-day
window of opportunity has elapsed, unfairly preventing the plaintiff from
pursuing a legitimate defamation claim.1
48
137 LIBEL REFORM ACT § 3(a) (Proposed Draft 1998), reprinted in RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 2
LAW OF DEFAMATION 9-71 (Thomson/West 2005) [hereinafter LIBEL REFORM ACT].
138 Id. § 4(a).
139 Id. § 6(a).
140 Id. § 3(a).
141 Id. § 3(d).
142 id.
143 Id. § 3 (d).
144 id.
145 Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 77, at 40.
146 id.
147 Judge Pierre N. Leval, who presided over the libel trial between General Westmore-
land and CBS, emerged as one of the Annenberg Proposal's sharpest critics. Judge Leval
was particularly dissatisfied with the retraction and reply provisions of the Proposal. See
generally Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its
Pro er Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988).
148 Id.
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2. Declaratory Judgment Provision
If the dispute is not resolved through retraction and reply, the next stage
of the Annenberg Proposal allows the plaintiff to file suit against the de-
fendant. 49 Either the plaintiff or the defendant may elect to try the libel suit
as declaratory judgment. 5 0 If either party takes this election, the plaintiff
loses the opportunity to seek monetary damages as a remedy to the de-
famatory statement.' 5' In addition, the defendant loses the protection of
constitutional fault requirements of negligence or actual malice, which
would normally apply.' The only issue at a declaratory judgment trial is
whether the statement at issue was true or false. The plaintiff bears the
burden of proof. This stage of the Proposal also contains a fee shifting
element that could require the loser to pay the winner's attorney fees.'
One of the criticisms of this provision is the patent unfairness of denying
the plaintiff the ability to recover any of his pecuniary damages. The prob-
lem is that no damages can be awarded under the current doctrine without
a showing of fault. 14 So either the declaratory judgment deals with only
the truth and falsity of the defamatory statement and it awards no damages
whatsoever, or there is a full trial with a showing of fault to award even a
minimum of damages. The drafters of the Annenberg Proposal opted to cut
fault out of the process and were forced to eliminate damages at the same
time. 5 5
Libel defense lawyers expressed some unease at the declaratory judg-
ment option in the Proposal. The removal of the First Amendment safe-
guards that have traditionally guaranteed victory were seen as unnerving.
56
"Feeling safe under the present law, they (the media) are unwilling to ven-
ture into the Act's unknown legal world."' 157 Three themes emerged in the
149 This provision is only triggered when the defendant refuses to print a retraction or
offer an opportunity to reply. As discussed above, if the plaintiff fails to request the retrac-
tion or reply, he cannot file suit. If the plaintiff is unsatisfied with the retraction, he is still
barred from filing suit.
150 LIBEL REFORM ACT, supra note 137, § 4(a).
151 Id. § 4 (d).
152 Id. § 4 (b).
m Id. § 10 (b) (stating in relevant part of commentary that while the Act contemplates
that the loser will pay the winner's attorneys' fees as a matter of course, a safety valve
provision allows the court to deny or reduce awards to any prevailing party who litigated
"vexatious or frivolous claims or defenses." ).
154 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985).
155 In some ways this aspect of the Annenberg Proposal was reflected in Whitten's anal-
ysis. Both proposals identify fault as an overwhelming burden to potential litigants. See
Whitten, supra note 51, at 522.
156 See Eleanor Randolph, Study Urges Law Be Changed to Reduce Libel Litigation,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1988, at A3 (attributing Henry Kaufman).
157 Rodney A. Smolla, 2 Law of Defamation 9-71, 49 (Thompson/West 2005).
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media's critique of the Proposal: "[F]irst, that the Proposal would generate
an increase in frivolous litigation; second, that the Proposal places an unre-
alistic and anti-speech emphasis on litigation over 'truth'; and third, that
the fee shifting provisions for attorneys' fees entail liability without fault in
violation of the First Amendment."
'1 58
3. Traditional Suit for Damages, with a Twist
If neither the plaintiff nor defendant elects the declaratory judgment op-
tion under Stage Two of the Annenberg Proposal, the dispute continues
under Stage Three as a traditional defamatory suit, but with a couple
changes.'59 The suit proceeds as current constitutional doctrine requires
except that it establishes a floor of negligence as fault. 6° The most signifi-
cant change is that the plaintiff can recover only for the damages he actu-
ally suffered.' 6' The proposal eliminates presumed and punitive dam-
ages.'62 There is also no provision for fee shifting under this Stage.
The Annenberg Proposal generated a lot of discussion, but failed to pro-
voke any real reform.'63 The reason may be explained by a fear by the me-
dia of significant changes contained within the Proposal. The Annenberg
Proposal still remains one of the most comprehensive attempts to resolve
the serious flaws within the current system.
D. Libel Law Reform Must Allow Plaintiffs to Restore Their Reputation
while Protecting the Rights of a Free Press
For libel law reform to be successful, any proposal must take into ac-
count the delicate balance of preserving the plaintiffs perception of his
reputation and the need of the press to protect itself against expensive and
invasive litigation in exercising its freedom. The failure of most libel law
reform is not that the basic ideas are unworkable, but rather that plaintiffs
and media defendants have not bought into the concepts. Consumers and
libel plaintiffs seek public accountability for false and harmful publications
from the media. The Iowa Libel Project cited a significant percentage of
plaintiffs who would have been deterred from litigation by an apology
and/or a correction. " Yet newspapers seem unwilling to apologize for fear
of leaving themselves open to litigation. This completely contrary ap-
18 Id at 50.
159 LIBEL REFORM ACT, supra note 137, § 6(a).
160 Id § 7.
161 Id. § 9(b).
162 Id. § 9(b)-(d).
163 See Bellah, supra note 11.
164 See Bezanson, supra note 28.
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proach has done nothing but employ attorneys to litigate, which is what
both parties desire to avoid.
Although a compromise appears impossible, considering the failed ef-
forts by some of the brightest legal minds in the country, one state has res-
urrected an old approach that is working. The next section will examine
Minnesota's use of a news council to arbitrate disputes between libel par-
ties. This solution has begun to attract a lot of attention from media groups
and potential libel plaintiffs as a more efficient mechanism to resolve dis-
putes.
VI. RESURRECTING NEWS COUNCILS
Many valiant attempts to reform libel law have never caught on in a
manner that could be considered successful. Yet each of the proposals
share several core values that any plausible alternative must embrace: a
shift in focus from fault to truth, an emphasis on reputational injury rather
than pecuniary damages, and a recognition that all parties benefit from a
fair and balanced process to air grievances.
News councils offer a legitimate alternative to legislative reform. A form
of alternative dispute resolution, news councils address the core values that
prompt those with injured reputations to sue.'65 Currently, Minnesota,
Washington, and Hawaii have news councils that demonstrate signs of real
progress and hope for large-scale reform.'66 These states have embraced
news councils as an effective mechanism to bypass the complexity of libel
law to more efficiently resolve complaints. 67 The idea of a news council
(local or national) is not new, but the fact that in a few states it is providing
165 In the absence of news councils, other forms of alternative dispute resolution have
been proposed as a means to avoid a broken system of libel law.
ADR offers libel litigants a chance to resolve their differences in a fair, timely and
cost-effective manner. The disputants can select an ADR procedure that best meets
their individual needs. The dispute is resolved privately out of the public spotlight, and
potential further damage to each party's reputation is minimized.
See Michael E. Weinzierl, Wisconsin's Court-Ordered ADR Law: Potential For Resolving
Libel Disputes, 1994 J. DIsP. RESOL. 193, 215 (1994). See also Jonathan Garret Erwin, Can
Deterrence Play a Positive Role in Defamation Law?, 19 REv. LITIG. 675, 705-11 (2000)
(weighing deterrence value in proposals to substitute declaratory judgment proceedings for
traditional libel litigation).
166 See Minnesota News Council, http://www.news-council.org/ (last visited Apr. 14,
2004). Information regarding Washington's New Council can be found at: Washington
News Council, http://www.wanewscouncil.org/index.html. The Hawaii News Council runs
a more informal operation and does not have a Web site. See Lori Robertson, Press Ac-
countability, Hawaiian Style, 20 AM. JOURNALISM REv. 13 (1998) With an admittedly in-
formal operation, little funding and no actual office, the Honolulu council meets monthly to
discuss ongoing issues and to throw 'kudos and darts' at the local media. Id. at 1.
167 Wisconsin lacks a formal news council, but its judiciary has embraced alternative
dispute resolution as a mechanism to resolve disputes involving reputational injury. See
Weinzierl, supra note 165, at 193.
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potential plaintiffs an opportunity to air their grievances and attain rulings
of truth or falsity with little cost to either party is extraordinary. This sec-
tion examines the history of news councils. It then looks at how the Minne-
sota News Council ("MNC") and Washington News Council 6 ' are balanc-
ing the primary concerns of plaintiffs wronged by the media and the First
Amendment rights of a free press.
A. The History and Purpose of News Councils
A news council is a quasi-legal forum where parties bring their com-
plaints about allegedly false and defamatory news coverage. The MNC's
mission is as follows: "Promoting fair, vigorous and trusted journalism by
engaging the news media and the public in examining standards of fair-
ness." 69 Supporters of news councils argue that they make the media more
accountable to the public which, in turn, helps to restore the media's credi-
bility." 170 Detractors warn that news councils give unchecked power to
institutions and chill free speech.'
71
A national news council operated sporadically between 1972 and 1982,
but was forced to shut down due to the lack of support from major news-
papers and networks. 72 The push for a national news council may have
168 Although three news councils currently function in the United States, this article
focuses on the MNC, which has operated the longest and received significant national atten-
tion. The Washington News Council does not publish formal Determinations like Minne-
sota, which makes their resolutions more difficult to document. Narrative descriptions and
links to some documents can be found at: Washington News Council,
http://www.wanewscouncil.org/Complaint%20Resolutions.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
169 See MNC, http://www.news-council.org/. Similarly, the Washington News Council's
mission is "to help maintain public trust and confidence in the print, broadcast and online
news media by promoting fairness, accuracy and balance." See also Washington News
Council, http://www.wanewscouncil.org/Archive%201999.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
170 See generally Mike Wallace, The Press Needs a National Monitor, WALL ST. J., Dec.
18, 1996, at A20.
171 See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, Leave the Press to the Court of Public Opinion, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1996, at 9 ("[News councils are] a terrible idea. As noted above, most
members of the public, particularly the 'responsible' sector, detest the press and would, if
given half a chance, annul the First Amendment and shoot us all.").
172
In part as a reaction to President Richard Nixon's critique of media prejudice, a Na-
tional News Council was formed in 1973 to fill the gap between letters-to-the-editor
and costly libel suits. Persons bringing complaints to the National Council had to
waive their rights to sue the accused news organizations. The Council ceased operating
in 1984 because it lacked support from the major national newspapers, including the
New York Times.
See generally David A. Logan, "Stunt Journalism," Professional Norms, and Public Mis-
trust of the Media, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 151 (1998). According to Mike Wallace,
two journalistic heavy hitters, New York Times Editor Abe Rosenthal and CBS News An-
chor Walter Cronkite, played a significant role in the demise of the National News Council.
See Wallace, supra note 170.
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faltered, but news councils are bringing parties to the table on the local
level. The success of the Minnesota and Washington News Councils may
well inspire support for the revival of a national council, advocated by 60
Minutes' Mike Wallace.
173
State news councils address complaints both large and small. 174 Com-
plainants may be private citizens,17 corporations, 176 public figures, 17 7 or
public officials.' 78 The MNC allows complaints to be filed electronically
via the Internet.' 79 In contrast, the Washington News Council provides its
form online, but completed forms must be submitted by mail.' 80 In both
states, the complainant trades his right to bring a libel suit in court for the
opportunity to have the dispute resolved by a group of people composed of
journalists and members of the general public. 8 ' The news council for-
173 "[T]he public should have some means to bring their complaints to someone with the
competence and authority to give a public 'thumbs up' or 'thumbs down' as to the accuracy
and the fairness of certain troubling news reports." Wallace, supra note 170. Wallace also
did an extensive piece on the MNC's handling of the dispute between WCCO and North-
west Airlines. Id.
174 Because news council complaints often do not have an associated dollar value at-
tached to the alleged reputational injury, assessing the "size" of the complaint can be diffi-
cult. Needless to say, some complaints are certainly higher profile than others. See, e.g., In
re Northwest Airlines against WCCO-TV, MINN. NEWS COUNCIL DETERMINATION 112
(1996) [hereinafter Northwest Airlines Complaint].
175 Private citizens have the lowest hurdle to prove fault, but most private complainants
only desire vindication of their reputation. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Dr. Philip Sallberg
against Rosseau Times-Region, MINN. NEWS COUNCIL DETERMINATION 127 (2000). The
MNC upheld complaints of neighbors whose objections to rezoning requests were inaccu-
rately reported in local paper. Id.
17Y See, e.g., In re Complaint of Gold'n Plump Co. against WCCO-TV, MINN. NEWS
COUNCIL DETERMINATION 135 (2003).
177 See, e.g., In re Complaint of John Kysylyczyn against Star Tribune, MINN. NEWS
COUNCIL DETERMINATION 146 (2006) (rejecting the former Mayor's complaint that a news
story unfairly criticized him).
1/8 Public officials and government agencies often seek resolution of complaints from
news councils. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Minnesota Dept. of Transportation against Star
Tribune, MINN. NEWS COUNCIL DETERMINATION 133 (2002) (rejecting complaint of state
agency that transportation contracts awarded unethically).
179 Minn. News Council, Complaint Form, http://www.news-council.org/form.htm (last
visited Apr. 14, 2007) (providing a simple, fill in the blank form to initiate the complaint
process).
180 Wash. News Council, Complaint Form, http://www.wanewscouncil.org/Documents/
WNCComplaint%20Form0725.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2007) (requesting a party to
check whether the story was inaccurate and in what way and whether or not there was an
ethical lapse by the media and what kind).
181 The MNC's waiver states, in part:
In consideration of the Minnesota News Council's agreement to consider my griev-
ance, I hereby waive any and all claims or demands that I may now hare or may here-
after have, of any kind or nature, before a government agency or before a court of law,
including defamation actions arising out of or pertaining to the subject matter of my
grievance against any person or corporation, including persons presenting information
to the Minnesota News Council, or against the Minnesota News Council , its members
20071
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
wards the complaint to the offending media and encourages a dialogue
between the parties, which may be mediated by news Council staff.182 If
the complaint is not resolved, the Council schedules a hearing. A hearing
before the MNC is a discussion about whether the publication was unfair,
rather than a determination of whether it meets the legal definition of de-
famatory. 183 Most cases that come before the news council do not meet the
legal burden established by Sullivan and its progeny," 4 but that does not
mean that the complaints lack merit. For example, most of the complaints
submitted to the MNC state that the publication was "inaccurate" or "left
the reader with the wrong impression.'
' 85
The MNC, in continuous operation for more than thirty-five years, has
successfully penetrated the legal landscape to become an accepted alterna-
tive to traditional litigation. 6 In 2006, even Minnesota's Attorney General
elected to file a complaint with the Council rather than initiate a lawsuit for
defamation. 187 State Attorney General Mike Hatch, then a gubernatorial
candidate, filed a detailed complaint regarding what he considered inap-
propriate questions from Minneapolis Star and Tribune reporters. 18  Ulti-
and employees for statements made during the proceedings or for the content of its de-
cisions or reports.
Minn. News Council, Waiver of Claims, http://www.news-
council.org/Waiver/o20of/o20Claims.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
182 See Minn. News Council, How to File a Complaint, http://www.news-
council.org/how to file.html#complaintform (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
'83 See id. In Minnesota, news outlets inform readers how to address complaints, includ-
ing the availability of the MNC. See e.g. Correction Policy of the St. Paul Pioneer Press,
2005 WLNR 15867519 (2005).
184 The complaint form required by the MNC does not include any mention of the actual
malice standard required by Sullivan. See Minn. News Council, Complaint Form,
http://www.news-council.org/form.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2007). See also N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-93 (1964).
185 See e.g. In re Complaint of Gold'n Plump Co. against WCCO-TV, MINN. NEWS
COUNCIL DETERMINATION 135 (2003). Gold'n Plump complained that a story broadcast by
the CBS-affiliate WCCO was "inaccurate, unbalanced and sensationalized." Id. The story
suggested that chicken sold by Gold'n Plump, and other similar food processors, may be
dangerous because "chickens treated with antibiotics develop resistance to those drugs."
The New Council upheld all complaints. Id.
186 The MNC has often been cited as a model for other states to consider. See, e.g., Larry
Fiquette, Local News Council Is Touchy Subject, 27 ST. Louis JOURNALISM REv. 7 (1996)
(discussing the success of the MNC and suggesting bringing the concept to Missouri).
187 See Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Hatch Calls Reporters' Questions Malicious: Their
Email Asked about Parking Ticket Rumors; News Council Rejects Complaint, KNIGHT
RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, July 25, 2006, at 3B. The dispute arose when reporters from the
Minneapolis Star and Tribune emailed Hatch for a comment regarding the circumstances
surrounding a parking ticket. Id. "The reporters wanted comment on rumors that the attor-
ney general parked his car because he was meeting his daughter, who was upset about a
boyfriend." Id.
188 See Pam Louwagie, Hatch Faults Star Tribune in News Council Complaint, STAR
TRiB., July 25, 2006, at lB. Hatch supplied copies of his Complaint to the press corps and
the story gained a life of its own, defeating the purpose of the Complaint. "Every year we
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mately, the MNC refused to consider Hatch's complaint since the offend-
ing material had not been published,'89 but the decision of Minnesota's top
lawyer to seek redress for his reputation injury at the MNC provides irrefu-
table evidence that the news council provides a viable alternative to the
archaic morass of libel law.
B. News Councils Achieve Core Values Identified in Libel Reform Pro-
posals
The MNC tackles tough issues and promotes real change in a manner ac-
ceptable to the Minnesota news media. For example, in 1974, the Council
sided with a private citizen who complained that the Minneapolis Tribune
erred when it published information about ransom drop-off points while
the kidnapping victim was still being held by her captors.' 0 The Minnea-
polis Tribune later issued a policy statement saying it would publish no
material that is likely to cause substantial harm to any person.' 9' In a sepa-
rate case, the MNC upheld Minneapolis Police Chief John Laux's com-
plaint in 1993 that KARE-TV crossed the line between reporting the news
and making news when it chartered an airplane to fly to Chicago in order
to pick up a wanted cop killer and turn him over to police on the news. 92
1. News Councils Shift the Focus from a New York Times Standard of
Fault to the Truth of the Complaint and the Fairness of the Reporting
Resolution of disputes brought to the MNC requires the council to focus
closely on the underlying facts of the dispute to determine whether the
media coverage was accurate and fair. 93 This approach represents a stark
look into hundreds of stories that never make it into the paper. That's what this was, until it
became a News Council complaint." Id. (quoting Star Tribune Editor Anders Gyllenhaal).
189 See Dane Smith, Hatch's Use of Resources Challenged, STAR TRIB., July 29, 2006, at
3B. "The complaint, which alleged that the Star Tribune was crossing a boundary and ask-
ing too many questions about Hatch's personal life, will not be heard by the nonprofit or-
ganization, which acts as a watchdog over the news media. The council only accepts com-
plaints about published material." Id.
190 See In re Complaint of Elizabeth Guthrie against the Minneapolis Tribune, MINN.
NEWS COUNCIL DETERMINATION 11 (1974), http://www.news-
council.org/Outcomes/outcomes-det- 11 .html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
191 Id. "We should engage in no news activity that is likely to bring injury or death to a
person because of our methods or actions. We need to get the news-swiftly and fully-but
not irresponsibly. No news story is worth a human life." Id.
192 See In re Complaint of Chief John Laux, Minneapolis Police Dept. against KARE-TV,
MINN. NEWS COUNCIL DETERMINATION 98 (1993), http://www.news-
council.org/Outcomes/outcomesdet-98.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007)
193 Complaints to the MNC include allegations that news coverage was unfair, unbal-
anced, sensationalized, and inaccurate. See MNC Hearing Index Reputations,




departure from the complicated issues of fault that dominate traditional
libel litigation. 94
The MNC's 1996 adjudication of a dispute between Northwest Airlines,
then the largest employer in Minnesota, and CBS-affiliate WCCO-TV pro-
vides an excellent example of how a high-profile conflict can be decided
on the merits of the complaint rather than become mired in the legal
machinations required by traditional libel litigation.'95 Specifically at issue
were the promotional spots that WCCO used to advertise a WCCO-TV
series. 196 Northwest Airlines claimed that the promotions painted a "con-
fusing but damning impression of Northwest as a company where a culture
of intimidation led to serious lapses in maintenance and passenger
safety."' 97 Northwest claimed that the images of Northwest hangar opera-
tions were photographed under the cover of night for the clandestine and
shocking effect it would have on the viewer. 98 Northwest also complained
of a number of words from a Federal Aviation Administration report that
were highlighted during the broadcast,' 99 including: "catastrophic failure,"
"investigation," "careless," and "endangered lives. 2 °°
By a wide margin, Northwest Airlines prevailed in its dispute with
WCCO-TV.21' The local press reported that "the Minnesota News Council
delivered a startlingly thorough rebuke to WCCO-TV., 202 The MNC up-
held the first of the three complaints and concluded that WCCO had
painted a "distorted, untruthful" picture of Northwest Airlines. °3 The
Council further found that promotions "for news should be held to the
194 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510-11 (1991) (discuss-
ing the complexities of the actual malice standard as applied to public figures); Church of
Scientology Int'l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that Church must
prove actual malice since it functions as a public figure).
195 See, e.g., Northwest Airlines Complaint, supra note 174.
196 Prior to this case, the MNC had not considered promotional spots. In this case it
addressed the threshold issue of whether to consider the promotions before upholding the
complaint. Id. The news media commented on the uniqueness of the News Council's
evaluation of the WCCO promotions. "As much as the prominence of the combatants, me-
dia-watchers are intrigued with the spectacle of someone with abundant resources calling
TV news's bluff in the context of promotional gimmickry." Brian Lambert, NWA-WCCO
Feud May Get '60 Minutes' of Fame, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 15, 1996, at IA.
197 Lambert, supra note 196.
198 Northwest Airlines Complaint, supra note 174.
199 Id.
200 Id. 'The surreal twist in this saga is that WCCO won a coveted Emmy award for the
Northwest story one day after it was discredited by the News Council." D.J. Tice, News
Council Judgment on WCCO-TV Must Serve as Reminder to All Media, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Oct. 23, 1996, at 6A.
201 Brian Lambert, Northwest Wins Fight with WCCO News Council Assails 'CCO-TV's
Report on Airline's Safety Record, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 19, 1996, at IA [hereinaf-
ter Northwest Wins]. "The Council upheld the complaint that WCCO painted a distorted,
untruthful picture of Northwest Airlines and the men and women who work there." Id.
202 Id.
203 Northwest Airlines Complaint, supra note 174.
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same high standard as the news itself.' 21 It then found that the promotions
themselves conveyed a distorted, untruthful picture of Northwest. °5
The substance of the hearing and the decision focused on the truthfulness
of the promotions and the story, the use of unreliable sources, and inflam-
matory rhetoric. 26 The written decision of the MNC, its "Determination,"
provided substantial detail regarding the offending statements and underly-
ing factual support of the story.2 7 As reputational experts suggest, these
are precisely the issues that potential plaintiffs seek when initiating litiga-
tion.2" Northwest vindicated its reputation while avoiding the substantial
investment of time and resources required to pursue libel litigation.20 9
2. News Councils Emphasize Reputational Injury over Monetary Damages
Complainants seeking news council intervention waive any right to fi-
nancial compensation for their reputational injury. This is not a deterrent to
use of news councils, because most potential litigants seek only one thing,
outweighing even pecuniary interests: resolution of the damage, real or
perceived, to reputation.2" ° "Plaintiffs express a clear interest in a process
that is directed straightforwardly to the truth issue, and that is directed to-
ward correction rather than money."2 1'
It is impossible to know whether disputes tendered to a news council
would have resulted in significant damage awards had the parties sought
traditional litigation. However, the prevalence of significant corporations
submitting their disputes to news councils suggests that even parties with
the means to pursue litigation and a colorable claim prefer a venue focused
on reputational injury.212 The outcome of a news council hearing provides
definitive answers regarding the substance of the media coverage. Winning
at the news council brings something more valuable than money to some-
204 Id. See also Northwest Wins, supra note 201.
205 Northwest Airlines Complaint, supra note 174.
206 Id.
207 Id. The Council's deliberation and the resulting Determination did not address any of
the traditional "actual malice" standards.
208 See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 79-82. "[P]laintiff motivations are predomi-
nantly reputation-related." Id. at 81.
209 Brian Lambert, How NWA 's Austin Took on WCCO ... and Won as '60 Minutes'
Prepares to give National Exposure to Northwest Airlines' News Council Case Against
WCCO, the Airlines' PR Chief Discusses His Strategy, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 7,
1996, at IF. "The attractiveness of the news council was that it offered a third-party judg-
ment on the merits of [the] claim without the expense and delay of a court trial." Id.
210 See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 28 at 168--69.
211 Id. at 169.
212 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Gold'n Plump Co. v. WCCO-TV, MINN. NEWS COUNCIL
DETERMINATION 135 (2003); Northwest Airlines v. WCCO-TV, MINN. NEWS COUNCIL
DETERMINATION 112 (1996); Catholic Def. League v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, MINN. NEWS
COUNCIL DETERMINATION 109 (1996).
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one wronged by the media: a public restoration of reputation. The St. Paul
Pioneer Press summed up the cost paid by WCCO for its unfair news story
and related promotional spots:
The council's decision carries no legal weight. In fact, complainants must agree to
forgo legal action in order for the council to hear their case. But considering the atten-
tion the case had received, not the least of which was the presence of CBS correspon-
dent Mike Wallace and a "60 Minutes" camera crew, it was a damning verdict and a
professional embarrassment for WCCO.
2 1 3
3. News Councils Recognize that All Parties Benefit from a Fair and Bal-
anced Process to Resolve Grievances
News councils provide an expeditious mechanism for resolving disputes
between media sources and those who suffer harm to reputation.214 Both
the Washington and Minnesota News Councils consist of twelve journal-
ists and twelve members of the community. 2 15 The combination of journal-
ism experts and community members allows the Councils to stand in the
shoes of both sides to assess injury and evaluate editorial process. The re-
sult is a balanced process that has resulted in complaints upheld in ap-
proximately fifty-four percent of the cases brought to the MNC since
1996.216
Even journalists admonished by the MNC acknowledge its value to the
community. During his closing statement to the Council, award-winning
journalist Don Shelby said, "This is a dishonor for me. You've taken the
wind out of my sails today. '217 Shelby told the Council that he had never
lied on television in nineteen years.218 "This will have a chilling effect on
me. ' 219 A year later, Shelby told the Minneapolis Star Tribune that WCCO
213 Lambert, supra note 196.
214 Traditional litigation can take years to resolve. The Northwest Airlines-WCCO dis-
pute took mere months to go from Complaint to Hearing and Determination. Northwest
Airlines Complaint, supra note 174.
215 For information regarding the membership of the MNC and Washington News Coun-
cil see Minnesota News Council, About Us, http://www.news-council.org/aboutus.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Washington News Council, Council Members,
http://www.wanewscouncil.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
16 Thirty-one complaints were upheld from 1996 to 2006 while twenty-six complaints
were not upheld. See Minnesota News Council, Hearing Index By Date, at
http://www.news-council.org/Outcomes/outcomesbydate.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
The MNC has received over a thousand complaints since 1971. Minnesota News Council,
Main Determinations Index, at http://www.news-
council.org/Outcomes/outcomesmain.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
217 Kristin Tillotson, News Council Sides with NWA in Dispute Over WCCO Report,
STAR TRIB., Oct. 19, 1996, at IA.
218 Lambert, supra note 196, at IA.
219 Id.
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had made mistakes with the story.22° "The promos . . . inflamed passions
and fears. The promos were bad. (The MNC's explicit condemnation of the
promos,) taught us a lesson. 22' Similarly, Minnesota Attorney General
Mike Hatch, whose complaint did not qualify for review by the MNC, pro-
fesses to have no regrets about filing the complaint.222
VII. CONCLUSION
Libel law desperately requires reform to provide a meaningful opportu-
nity for redress of reputational injury, and to ensure that press defendants
retain their constitutionally guaranteed rights.23 The appeal of news coun-
cils is obvious when the motivations prompting plaintiffs to sue for libel
are taken into consideration. While the timeline for relief through litigation
is lengthy, plaintiffs who opt for news councils get instant satisfaction by
airing complaints and having the tribunal immediately rule on the merits of
the complaint. The defendant gets the benefit of an expedited process that
is significantly less expensive and cuts to the merits of the complaint. Ad-
ditionally, since there is no formal discovery, the sanctity of the newsroom
is much more likely to be preserved.
The appeal of news council, either local or national, was best captured by
prominent Minnesota editorialist D.J. Tice following the Northwest-
WCCO-TV decision:
We in the news media need to be reminded often of the power we wield and of the
devastating impact unfair coverage has on people and companies and communities.
The public also needs to be reminded, often, to maintain a healthy skepticism about
media pronouncements-even when the target of a journalistic fusillade is an outfit
everybody loves to resent, like Northwest Airlines. Minnesota's unique News Council,
an independent, voluntary forum for resolving complaints about the media, is a place
where such vital reminders can be heard.
224
220 Brian Lambert, CCO, Shelby Still Reeling In NWA Wake, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 8D.
221 Id. (parentheses in original).
222 See Politicians Struggle With Family Privacy, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., July 30, 2006.
223 "(l]n view of [the] expensiveness, cumbersomeness, and indirection of the current
legal process, fundamental reshaping of the libel system and the constitutional privileges
should be considered, and alternative non-judicial processes should be seriously explored."
Bezanson, supra note 4, at 169.
224 Tice, supra note 202, at 6A.

